





















































































































































Bypassing the Bust: The Stability 
of Upstate New York’s Housing 
Markets during the Recession
Jaison R. Abel and Richard Deitz
Over the past decade, the United States has seen real estate 
activity swing from boom to bust. But upstate New York has 
been largely insulated from this volatility, with metropolitan 
areas such as Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse even registering 
home price increases during the recession. An analysis of upstate 
housing markets over the most recent residential real estate cycle 
indicates that the region’s relatively low incidence of nonprime 
mortgages and the better-than-average performance of these 
loans contributed to this stability.
T
he United States experienced a sizable boom in real estate activity between 1998 
and 2006, followed by a sharp contraction. Home prices rose on average more 
than 8 percent per year between 2000 and 2006—but have been falling more 
recently at an average annual rate of 4 percent.1 In states such as California, Arizona, 
and Florida, the collapse in home prices has been particularly severe. Somewhat 
surprisingly, however, many parts of the country have not experienced dramatic 
declines in housing prices, with some regions even registering price increases since 
the recession began. Upstate New York is one such region. Despite upstate’s long-term 
weak economic growth and population loss, Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse all 
ranked in the top 10 percent of metro areas in terms of home price appreciation 
in 2009, with Buffalo ranking sixth overall.
In this edition of Second District Highlights, we assess the performance of upstate 
New York’s housing markets during the most recent residential real estate cycle. We 
analyze the extent to which the region has been insulated from the boom-bust pattern 
in housing prices seen in many parts of the country since 2000 and compare the 
pattern of real estate activity for the region with patterns for U.S. metropolitan areas. 
We also examine the extent of lending activity in the riskiest segment of the resi-
dential mortgage market—“nonprime” mortgages—and compare the regional and 
national penetration and performance of these loans. 
1 Figures reﬂ  ect the four-quarter price change in the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) All 
Transactions house price index as of second-quarter 2009. The index is based on conventional and 
conforming loans and includes both repeat purchases and reﬁ  nances; it is available for 383 metro-
politan areas/divisions. We rely on the FHFA index rather than the more volatile S&P/Case-Shiller 
house price index because of its broader geographic coverage. See Calhoun (1996) and Leventis (2008) 
for more details on the construction of the FHFA house price index and how it differs from the S&P/
Case-Shiller index.2
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We ﬁ  nd that upstate New York’s housing markets have been 
relatively stable during the U.S. recession, with many metro 
areas outperforming the nation. Moreover, fewer nonprime loans 
originated in the region than was typical across the country, and 
upstate’s nonprime loan performance was better than the U.S. 
average, with lower rates of delinquency and foreclosure. These 
mortgage dynamics, together with upstate’s relatively steady 
economic performance during the recession, help explain the 
recent stability of the region’s housing markets.
The Housing Boom in the United States 
and the Trend in Upstate New York
The United States experienced a housing boom in the mid-1990s 
that lasted until 2006. Sales of existing homes rose signiﬁ  cantly 
between 1995 and 2000, followed by an even sharper increase in 
activity into 2005 (Chart 1). After sales peaked in 2005, activity 
declined sharply into 2008, then turned up modestly in 2009. In 
contrast, residential real estate activity across upstate New York 
was relatively ﬂ  at throughout the period. Indeed, while existing 
home sales increased more than 75 percent between 1995 and 
2005 in the United States, sales rose only 15 percent in upstate 
New York. Although sales activity in the region trended well below 
that of the nation during this period, the subsequent decline in 
home sales was less pronounced upstate. Between 2005 and 2008, 
home sales fell only 10 percent there, compared with an approxi-
mately 30 percent decline nationwide. Other indicators of housing 
activity, such as residential building permits, display similar 
patterns for the relative performance of upstate New York and 
the country.
Just as the boom in home sales was subdued upstate, home 
price appreciation was limited (Chart 2).  The rate of apprecia-
tion in the region was well below that of the nation until early 
2007, with home price declines registered occasionally during 
the 1995-2000 period.2 From 2004 to 2006—the period of most 
rapid appreciation in the United States—the pace of appreciation 
in upstate New York also rose signiﬁ  cantly, although it remained 
consistently below the country’s. The rate of U.S. home price 
appreciation declined dramatically beginning in 2006. In 2007 
and 2008, upstate’s rate of price growth outpaced the nation’s, 
and prices continued to climb into 2009—despite a nearly 4 per-
cent decline in home values nationwide in the ﬁ  rst half of 2009. 
2 Our aggregate upstate New York house price index is calculated using data 
on existing single-family home sales in the nine major metropolitan areas in 
the region: Albany, Binghamton, Buffalo, Elmira, Glens Falls, Ithaca, Rochester, 
Syracuse, and Utica. Our data sources are the National Association of Realtors 
and Moody’s Economy.com. To construct the index, we follow the same 
methodology used by the FHFA to compile its national house price index. 
Speciﬁ  cally, we set our index to equal 100 in ﬁ  rst-quarter 1995 and adjust it each 
successive quarter based on the weighted average quarterly price change for the 
nine upstate metropolitan areas, with the weights based on the contemporary 
share of one-unit detached properties in each metropolitan area. For more detail, 
see http://www.fhfa.gov/.
Differences in the patterns of home price appreciation in part 
reﬂ  ect upstate’s relatively poor economic performance leading up 
to the housing peak and better-than-average performance during 
the recession. Between 2000 and 2007, for example, employment 
in upstate New York declined at an average rate of 0.1 percent 
per year, compared with a national increase of 0.6 percent. By 
contrast, between the December 2007 start of the recession and 
October 2009, upstate shed 2.1 percent of its jobs, compared with 
5.2 percent in the nation. Note, however, that the upstate economy 
tended to outperform many of its peer economies in the Great 
Sources: Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), All Transactions index; 
U.S. Census Bureau; Moody’s Economy.com; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Upstate New York is an aggregate of the Albany, Binghamton, Buffalo, Elmira, 
Glens Falls, Ithaca, Rochester, Syracuse, and Utica metropolitan statistical areas. 
Upstate was aggregated using housing unit weights in a process similar to that 
employed by the FHFA to create its U.S. index.
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Sources: National Association of Realtors; Moody’s Economy.com estimates.
Note: Upstate New York is an aggregate of the Albany, Binghamton, Buffalo, Elmira, 
Glens Falls, Ithaca, Rochester, Syracuse, and Utica metropolitan statistical areas.
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Upstate New YorkLakes region during both periods. For example, Cleveland and 
Detroit experienced employment declines of 0.8 percent and 
2.2 percent in the period leading up to the recession, but from 
the onset of the recession through October 2009, they lost 
6.7 percent and 8.2 percent of their jobs, respectively.3 
To illustrate the pattern of upstate New York’s home prices 
relative to the rest of the country, we examine in more detail the 
regional dimension of house price dynamics. 
House Price Appreciation across Metropolitan Areas
One often hears that “all real estate is local.” Consistent with this 
idea, the patterns of house price appreciation and decline over 
the most recent real estate cycle varied considerably among U.S. 
metropolitan areas. In general, however, regions that experienced 
the most signiﬁ  cant house price increases tended to suffer the 
most signiﬁ  cant declines. This negative correlation is presented 
in Chart 3.4 The chart classiﬁ  es metropolitan areas into one of 
3 For more on upstate New York’s economic performance relative to the nation and 
to the Great Lakes region leading up to the recession, see Abel and Deitz (2008).
4 A correlation is a statistic that measures how closely two variables move 
together. A positive correlation indicates movement in the same direction, 
while a negative correlation points to movement in opposite directions. 
four categories based on where rates of appreciation fell relative 
to the national average. In the “boom, bust” metro areas (lower 
right quadrant), home prices increased faster than the average 
U.S. annual rate of 8.1 percent between 2000 and 2006, then fell 
at a more rapid pace than the U.S. rate of -0.3 percent between 
2006 and 2008. In “modest or no boom, no bust” areas (upper left 
quadrant), prices increased less rapidly than the national aver-
age between 2000 and 2006 and declined less rapidly than the 
average (or increased) between 2006 and 2008. “Boom, no bust” 
metro areas (upper right quadrant) saw prices rise more rapidly 
than the national average during both periods. And in areas 
designated “modest or no boom, bust” (lower left quadrant), 
prices increased more slowly than the U.S. average (or decreased) 
during both periods. 
As we observed, metropolitan areas with the fastest price 
appreciation in the earlier period tended to experience the 
sharpest declines over the later period (lower right quadrant). 
Geographic clustering is also apparent, with fourteen of the 
twenty-ﬁ  ve most rapidly growing markets in the “boom, bust” 
areas located in California and ten found in Florida. Each of these 
areas saw about a 15 to 20 percent price appreciation per year on 
average during the boom. Once prices began to fall in 2006, the 
metro areas experienced very large price decreases between 2006 
  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   3
2006-08 annual home price change
Chart 3
Metro Area Home Price Appreciation, 2000-08
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Sources: Federal Housing Finance Agency, All Transactions index; Moody’s Economy.com.
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and 2008, averaging around 15 to 20 percent per year, with prices 
in Merced, Stockton, and Modesto, California, all declining at an 
average annual rate exceeding 20 percent.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, most U.S. metro areas actually 
experienced more moderate increases in house prices than the 
nation between 2000 and 2006. In fact, 249 of the 383 metro-
politan areas tracked by the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
saw price increases below the national rate of 8.1 percent dur-
ing the boom. Outsized increases, by contrast, tended to occur 
in large, highly populated metro areas; the average rate for 
the nation as a whole strongly reﬂ  ects the experience of these 
places. Most areas also outperformed the nation, which had a 
0.3 percent rate of decline, over the 2006-08 period.5 Indeed, 
220 metropolitan areas experienced below-average house price 
appreciation between 2000 and 2006, and then performed better 
than the nation between 2006 and 2008—and thus fall into the 
“modest or no boom, no bust” category. Most upstate metro 
areas—including Binghamton, Buffalo, Elmira, Rochester, 
Syracuse, and Utica—are in this group (Table 1). 
The twenty-nine worst-performing metropolitan areas had 
lower rates of appreciation than the nation during both periods 
(lower left quadrant). Ten of the eleven largest home price 
declines over the 2006-08 period occurred in Michigan. The best-
performing metropolitan areas had faster-than-average house 
price appreciation in both periods (upper right quadrant). These 
areas include Honolulu and Virginia Beach, together with Albany, 
5 Across all 383 metropolitan areas, the median annual price change was 
5.8 percent between 2000 and 2006 and 1.9 percent between 2006 and 2008, 
compared with the national price change (roughly equivalent to a weighted 
mean of the metropolitan areas) of 8.1 percent and -0.3 percent, respectively, 
as measured by the national FHFA house price index.
Glens Falls, and Ithaca. In fact, based on home price appreciation 
in each period, Glens Falls and Ithaca were among the top-
performing metropolitan areas in this quadrant. 
The map shows the geographic concentration of these dif-
ferent groups. “Boom, bust” metropolitan areas appear in three 
regions of the country: along the west coast, in Florida, and 
along the northeast corridor. Areas classiﬁ  ed as “modest or no 
boom, bust” cluster along the Great Lakes and dot Colorado 
and Arkansas. Metro areas in the “modest or no boom, no bust” 
category populate much of the country, while “boom, no bust” 
areas appear in parts of upstate New York, along the eastern 
coastline, in the Northwest (including areas surrounding Seattle 
and Portland), and in several other states. 
These home price dynamics in part reﬂ  ect relative differences 
in economic performance among regions, although lending 
activity likely played a role as well. To provide a deeper under-
standing of the relative performance of upstate New York’s 
housing markets, we examine the prevalence and performance 
of more risky, nonprime loans. 
Regional Penetration and Performance 
of Nonprime Loans
The proliferation of nonprime mortgages has been a signiﬁ  cant 
feature of the recent housing cycle. Nonprime mortgages are 
loans that are considered more risky than traditional loans, for a 
number of reasons.6 This increased risk may stem from the loan’s 
large size or nontraditional structure, or from borrowers who 
have a poor credit rating, have a higher ratio of debt to income, 
do not provide full documentation of income or assets, or borrow 
close to (or more than) the value of the property on which the 
loan is based. 
As the economy and the housing market weakened at the start 
of the recession, a signiﬁ  cant share of nonprime mortgages began 
to perform relatively poorly, particularly those originated between 
2005 and 2007, a pattern that resulted in rising delinquencies and 
foreclosures (Haughwout, Peach, and Tracy 2008). The relationship 
between nonprime lending activity, loan performance, and hous-
ing market dynamics at the regional level is critically important 
when assessing regional housing market performance during the 
recent cycle. Accordingly, we examine the prevalence and perfor-
mance of nonprime loans across metropolitan areas, including 
upstate New York, and the extent to which these factors were 
associated with regional housing market dynamics.
Our data source is First American CoreLogic’s LoanPerfor-
mance data set (LP Data). As of mid-2009, these data include 
6 Nonprime loans consist of subprime and alt-A loans. Subprime loans are 
typically of smaller value than prime loans and are made to borrowers with an 
imperfect credit history, while alt-A loans are typically larger value loans made to 
borrowers who may choose not to provide the full documentation of income or 
assets usually required to obtain prime mortgages.
Table 1
Annual Percentage Change in Home Prices
Area 2000-06 2006-08 2008:H1-2009:H1
United  States    8.1    -0.3    -3.7
Upstate metropolitan areas
Glens  Falls    10.8    4.7    -1.3
Albany    10.1    2.5    -1.0
Ithaca    8.3    3.7    -0.4
Utica    6.9    5.2    0.7
Binghamton    6.5    6.8    1.8
Syracuse    6.2    2.7    1.0
Buffalo    4.8    2.8    2.3
Elmira    4.5    2.0    6.0
Rochester 3.8  1.9   1.4
Sources: Federal Housing Finance Agency,  All Transactions index; Moody’s Economy.com.
Note: 2008:H1 and 2009:H1 refer to an average of the ﬁ  rst two quarters of the year.  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   5
monthly loan-level information for nearly 5 million active, 
securitized nonprime loans with total balances of more than 
$1 trillion. While the LP Data capture more than 90 percent of 
securitized nonprime loans after 1999 and nearly all such loans 
beginning in 2003, they exclude all loans held in bank portfolios 
(Mayer and Pence 2008). Such exclusions necessarily omit some 
of the nonprime loans made during our study period, so our 
estimates of the penetration of these loans may be understated. 
Furthermore, the performance of loans in bank portfolios may 
differ from the performance of loans that we can observe from 
the LP Data. Nonetheless, these data capture the majority of 
nonprime lending activity and offer valuable insight into the 
pattern of nonprime lending activity and loan performance 
across the country.
Penetration of Nonprime Loans
To measure the prevalence of nonprime lending across met-
ropolitan areas, we calculate the number of nonprime loans 
per 1,000 housing units, using data from 2006—when activity 
peaked.7 This metric captures the extent of nonprime lend-
ing activity in the overall housing market. Table 2 shows the 
penetration of nonprime loans in the United States by the four 
boom-bust groupings assigned earlier and for the individual 
metropolitan areas in upstate New York. It reveals that nonprime 
lending activity was much lower upstate than it was nationwide. 
Nationally, there were 55.5 such loans per 1,000 housing units—
more than double the number for most of upstate New York’s 
metro areas. Within upstate New York, nonprime penetration 
was highest in Albany and Glens Falls and lowest in Ithaca. With 
a penetration rate of 81.6 loans per 1,000 households, nonprime 
lending activity was strongest in the “boom, bust” regions. In 
contrast, with a penetration rate of 47.0, nonprime lending 
7 To avoid double counting multiple loans on the same property, we report 
the number of ﬁ  rst-lien loans only. While LP Data include information 
on subordinate-lien loans, it is not possible to match these loans to their 
corresponding ﬁ  rst-lien loans. To assess nonprime penetration, we use 
information on total housing units published by the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
population estimates program (http://www.census.gov/popest/estimates.html).
Sources: Federal Housing Finance Agency, All Transactions index; Moody’s Economy.com. 
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activity was lowest in metropolitan areas classiﬁ  ed as “modest or 
no boom, no bust.” 
These penetration patterns suggest that areas with more 
nonprime lending activity would have had stronger home price 
appreciation through the housing peak, along with more signiﬁ  -
cant price declines during the subsequent period. To assess this 
correlation more formally, we plot nonprime loan penetration 
relative to the increase in home prices between 2000 and 2006 for 
every metropolitan area (Chart 4, top panel). The chart conﬁ  rms 
a strong positive correlation between nonprime lending activity 
and house price appreciation during this period. 
Why might this correlation hold? It is likely that causation 
runs in both directions—an increase in nonprime lending led 
to more signiﬁ  cant home price appreciation, and more rapid 
home price appreciation led to a rise in nonprime lending. As 
for the ﬁ  rst relationship, the availability of nonprime loans 
would have expanded the supply of credit by providing ﬁ  nancing 
opportunities to those unable to obtain prime mortgages. This 
trend in turn would have brought more buyers into the housing 
market, driving up the demand for housing and, all else equal, 
increasing home prices.8 However, home price appreciation itself 
may have contributed to the spike in nonprime lending. Lenders 
may have been more willing to make loans on properties whose 
value was increasing and expected to continue to rise, especially 
when the price increases were rapid. Under these circumstances, 
loans on properties with rising values would appear less risky. 
One primary determinant of risk from the lender’s perspective is 
the balance of the loan relative to the value of the property, often 
referred to as the loan-to-value ratio, or LTV. As the value of a 
home rises, the LTV falls, and a low LTV loan is considered less 
risky than a high LTV loan. The reason is that borrowers are less 
likely to default on a low LTV loan, primarily because they have 
more to lose, as their equity would be potentially surrendered 
upon default. Even if a default were to occur, a rising home value 
provides a valuable cushion to mitigate any potential losses the 
lender may incur when taking possession of a property after 
a loan fails. Moreover, homeowners experiencing rapid house 
price appreciation may be more likely to reﬁ  nance their mort-
gages to gain access to their home equity. 
8 To some extent, an increase in home prices may have led to more new home 
construction, which would dampen any rise in prices.
Table 2
Nonprime Loan Penetration and Performance












United  States    55.5    13.2    12.6    5.2    5.0
Modest  or  no  boom,  bust    58.3    15.1    11.3    5.7    4.3
Modest or no boom, no bust     47.0     11.9     6.8     3.7     2.1
Boom,  no  bust    52.1    11.5    8.9    4.2    3.2
Boom,  bust    81.6    14.3    17.1    8.8    10.5
Upstate metropolitan areas
Albany    31.3    12.5    12.0    2.8    2.7
Glens  Falls    28.6    12.5    10.1    2.8    2.2
Elmira    24.7    9.4    7.1    1.9    1.4
Rochester    24.6    10.7    8.1    2.0    1.5
Buffalo    21.2    10.3    6.5    1.7    1.1
Syracuse    20.0    11.0    9.7    1.7    1.5
Binghamton    19.7    10.5    7.1    1.7    1.1
Utica    17.5    11.2    7.0    1.6    1.0
Ithaca  9.4   11.5 6.5 0.8 0.4
Sources: First American CoreLogic, LoanPerformance data; U.S. Census Bureau.
Notes: Penetration measures the number of loans in each category per 1,000 housing units. Rate measures the number of loans in each category as a percentage of total 
nonprime loans. A loan is considered delinquent if it is ninety or more days past due. A loan is considered in foreclosure once it has entered the foreclosure process.  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   7
to the region’s relatively slow home price appreciation leading up 
to and during the boom years.
Despite this outcome, it is clear that nonprime lending activity 
was positively correlated with home price appreciation through 
the peak in housing activity, and it is apparent that areas with a 
higher penetration of nonprime loans in 2006 had more signiﬁ  -
cant price declines in the 2006-08 period (Chart 4, bottom panel). 
This correlation is not surprising given that price appreciation in 
the 2000-06 period is negatively correlated with price apprecia-
tion in the 2006-08 period. The relatively poor performance of 
nonprime loans during the recession was a likely contributor 
to this dynamic. To study these relationships in more detail, we 
examine the performance of nonprime loans across U.S. metro-
politan areas and in the upstate New York region and analyze the 
connection between nonprime loan performance and the pattern 
of home price changes.
Performance of Nonprime Loans
By calculating current delinquency and foreclosure rates, we 
can assess the performance of nonprime loans at the metro-
politan area level.9 We measure delinquencies as loans that are 
ninety or more days past due and foreclosures as loans that have 
entered the foreclosure process. As expected, the performance of 
nonprime loans systematically differs across metropolitan areas 
(Table 2). The highest delinquency and foreclosure rates are in 
the “boom, bust” and “modest or no boom, bust” areas, and the 
lowest delinquency and foreclosure rates are in the areas that 
did not undergo a housing bust.
In general, metropolitan areas with more signiﬁ  cant home 
price declines tended to have relatively poor nonprime loan 
performance (Chart 5). A strong negative correlation is appar-
ent between nonprime foreclosure rates and the average annual 
change in home prices in the 2006-08 period.10 There are several 
reasons for this correlation. First, homeowner equity tended to 
decrease in areas where home prices fell. As previously outlined 
for the case when prices are increasing, declining house prices in 
areas that experienced a housing bust raised LTVs and increased 
the risk of default and foreclosure. In extreme cases, home prices 
declined so much that homeowners fell into a negative equity 
position, where the balance on a mortgage exceeded the value of 
the home, providing a strong incentive for borrowers to abandon 
mortgages rather than continue to make payments. Indeed, 
recent estimates suggest that as many as 29 percent of all non-
prime mortgages were in a negative equity position by the end 
9 Here we use LP Data as of August 2009.
10 Policy actions at the regional level designed to mitigate foreclosures, such as 
foreclosure moratoriums, may reduce foreclosure rates in some metropolitan 
areas. Thus, such actions could understate the “true” relationship between home 
price declines and the amount of foreclosure activity.
Indeed, recent empirical research conﬁ  rms that the relation-
ship between nonprime lending and house price appreciation 
runs in both directions. Mian and Suﬁ   (2009) show that the 
expansion of credit through nonprime lending resulted in 
more rapid home price appreciation at the Zip code level, while 
Wheaton and Nechayev (2008) and Goetzmann, Peng, and Yen 
(2009) show that metropolitan areas with faster home price 
growth saw greater demand for nonprime mortgages. However, 
because these relationships are self-reinforcing, it is difﬁ  cult to 
determine the extent to which these different dynamics were at 
work or the relative importance of each dynamic in contributing 
to the pattern of house prices observed during the current cycle. 
In upstate New York, the relatively low penetration of nonprime 
mortgages likely contributed to the region’s more modest home 
price appreciation, but it may also reﬂ  ect the response of lenders 
Sources: First American CoreLogic, LoanPerformance data; Federal Housing Finance 
Agency, All Transactions index; U.S. Census Bureau; Moody’s Economy.com.
Notes: Loan penetration is the number of nonprime loans per 1,000 housing units. 
The dashed line represents a linear trend line.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Chart 4
Nonprime Loan Penetration and Home Price Changes
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of 2008 (Haughwout and Okah 2009). This dynamic was probably 
most visible in “boom, bust” metropolitan areas in states such 
as California, where price declines were among the most severe. 
Further, the poor loan performance in these areas may be the 
result of  households’ reduced ability to repay their debt in states 
such as Michigan, where unemployment rates are high. Poor loan 
performance, especially when leading to foreclosure sales, along 
with recessionary pressures tends to dampen housing prices. 
This dynamic most likely played a role in “modest or no boom, 
bust” metropolitan areas such as Detroit. In any case, these 
mechanisms tend to reinforce one another.
As one might expect, upstate New York’s rate of delinquencies 
and foreclosures on nonprime loans was lower than the national 
average, and in many instances noticeably lower (Table 2). The 
delinquency rate for the nation was 13.2 percent, compared 
with a high among upstate metropolitan areas of 12.5 percent in 
Albany and a low of 9.4 percent in Elmira. Similarly, the nation’s 
foreclosure rate was 12.6 percent, while rates in upstate metro 
areas ranged from 12.0 percent in Albany to 6.5 percent in both 
Buffalo and Ithaca. Again, Albany and Glens Falls stand out 
among upstate New York’s metropolitan areas as being closer to 
U.S. ﬁ  gures. Delinquency and foreclosure rates there were near 
the national averages, suggesting that nonprime loans were 
riskier in these two areas than across upstate.
The combination of lower nonprime loan penetration and 
lower delinquency and foreclosure rates suggests that upstate 
New York has been less affected than other parts of the coun-
try by the more distressing aspects of the nonprime mortgage 
market. To measure the extent to which the region has been 
affected by foreclosures, we calculate the number of foreclosures 
per 1,000 housing units (Table 2). This metric measures the 
degree to which nonprime loan delinquencies and foreclosures 
penetrate the region’s housing markets. We ﬁ  nd that nonprime 
delinquencies and foreclosures have affected a smaller share 
of the housing market in upstate New York than in the nation. 
Delinquency and foreclosure penetration rates upstate are less 
than half of those observed nationally and less than a third of 
those observed in the “boom, bust” metropolitan areas. This 
pattern of relatively low nonprime loan penetration and relatively 
strong nonprime loan performance helps explain the stability of 
the region’s housing markets during the recession.
Conclusion
During the past decade, the United States has experienced a 
signiﬁ  cant boom and bust in residential real estate activity. 
In contrast, the housing markets in upstate New York have 
remained relatively stable. Indeed, since the U.S. housing market 
began to decline in 2006, residential real estate activity upstate 
has remained relatively ﬂ  at, and home prices continued to rise 
through 2009. During the housing boom of 2000-06, home prices 
in Binghamton, Buffalo, Elmira, Rochester, Syracuse, and Utica 
did not appreciate as rapidly as the national average, although 
prices in Albany, Glens Falls, and Ithaca outpaced it. Since then, 
home prices in every upstate metro area have risen faster, or 
fallen more slowly, than the national average.
One factor that likely contributed to the stability of up-
state New York’s housing markets in the last decade is its low 
incidence of nonprime mortgages. The penetration of these 
relatively risky loans in upstate New York was far less signiﬁ  cant 
than the penetration in other parts of the country, particularly 
when compared with metropolitan areas that experienced a 
housing bust. Moreover, the loans have performed better upstate 
than they have nationally. In contrast, metropolitan areas with 
a higher penetration of these loans by 2006—when activity 
peaked—experienced faster home price appreciation, but also 
saw a relatively rapid decline in values once the reversal began. 
Accordingly, a larger number of the nonprime loans that origi-
nated in these areas have entered delinquency or foreclosure. 
These patterns of nonprime lending activity help explain why 
housing markets in upstate New York fared better that those in 
other parts of the country during the most recent recession. 
Chart 5
Foreclosure Rates and Home Price Changes
2006-08 annual home price change













Sources: First American CoreLogic, LoanPerformance data; Federal Housing Finance 
Agency, All Transactions index; U.S. Census Bureau; Moody’s Economy.com.
Notes: Loan penetration is the number of nonprime loans per 1,000 housing units. 
The dashed line represents a linear trend line.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues   9
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